Core Government Decision making and Political Governance - what we have learnt in the first weeks of Module 2 of the UK Covid 19 Inquiry

We are three weeks into Module 2 of the UK Covid 19 Inquiry, which is looking at decision making and political governance during the pandemic. So far we have heard from expert witnesses, some of whom gave scientific advice to the UK government. Importantly, the module began by hearing from a bereaved family member from each nation of the UK, including from Jo Goodman, our co-founder, and Catriona Myles, a member from our Northern Ireland branch. Their powerful testimonies gave the Inquiry an insight into the heartbreak behind the headlines, and served as a reminder of the consequences of the decisions and mistakes the Inquiry was to uncover in the coming weeks.  

Again and again throughout the mishandling of the pandemic, politicians told us that they were ‘following the science’. Module 2 of the Inquiry has made it clear that this was a meaningless strapline, one that, according to Professor John Edmunds of SAGE, politicians used in an attempt to hide behind scientists when they had to make tough policy decisions. 

There is rarely scientific consensus on any given subject, and scientific experts are not policy experts. Which scientific questions are asked, and which experts are instructed to provide answers, are political decisions. How scientific advice informs public policy is also up to politicians. The government and independent scientific advisors we have heard from so far have revealed the ways in which the systems designed to help scientists advise policy makers failed. They also revealed when scientific advice was ignored. No scientific advisor was consulted on the policy of Eat Out to Help Out, for example, a policy understood by Professor Edmunds of SAGE to be ‘encouraging people to take an epidemiological risk’. 

Chaos in the heart of government cost lives. We heard that No 10 could have saved thousands of lives through early intervention. Had the UK followed the example of countries in East Asia and locked down sooner, we would have been able to lockdown for shorter periods of time. According to Tom Hale, Professor of Global Public Policy, acting too late reduced the effectiveness of the UK’s response throughout the pandemic. Delaying restrictions led to us needing tighter restrictions, which then led to the government lifting measures too soon, putting pressure on the health service, which is the opposite of what a lockdown was intended to do. In effect, the UK’s approach to lockdowns led to a large death toll, long periods of restriction and negative economic consequences. Even when the virus was being controlled in the wider population through lockdowns, Covid 19 was spreading rapidly through those most vulnerable, in hospitals and care homes. 

The disastrous decision to delay lockdown seems to have stemmed from a belief amongst politicians at the top of government that if restrictions were brought in too soon it would result in ‘behavioural fatigue’; the population would get tired of restrictions earlier and stop following the rules sooner. But the Independent Scientific Pandemic Insights group on Behaviours (SPI-B), set up with the very purpose of advising the government on the relationship between people’s behaviour and the pandemic, claim never to have advised the government that ‘behavioural fatigue’ was a risk, and SAGE in fact raised in it’s minutes that the risk of ‘behavioural fatigue’ was no reason to delay lockdown.  As we hear from politicians and No 10 staff in the coming weeks it will hopefully become clear where this advice, which caused thousands of preventable deaths and put the UK on the back foot throughout the duration of the pandemic, came from. 

The Inquiry should also investigate why the advice that was actually given by SPI-B,  to provide financial support to help people self isolate, was essentially ignored. So far, it isn’t clear what prevented advisors from speaking out with more force. WhatsApps revealed to the Inquiry have shown that the current Chief Scientific Advisor, Angela McLean (then Chief Scientific Advisor to the Ministry of Defence) referred to Rishi Sunak as the ‘Dr Death the Chancellor’ over Eat Out to Help Out plans, and the public needs to know why, when it was known to be a deadly plan, it was allowed to happen. 

The Inquiry also heard from non-government, independent experts who were critical of the scientific advice given to the government, as well as the government’s response. Professor Anthony Costello criticised SAGE for not expressing more urgency in their advice. Other independent expert witnesses in the Inquiry  have criticised the secrecy surrounding advice given to the government. There were significant delays in publishing SAGE minutes, and, shockingly, No 10 asked some experts to sign Non Disclosure Agreements before they would ask for their advice. Good science is founded on the principle of openness and peer review, and yet transparency was lacking when we needed it most. 

When it came to communication between Westminster and devolved administrations, secrecy was a political choice. The Inquiry heard that then Prime Minister Boris Johnson didn’t want to maximise the involvement of devolved leaders in decision making that affected the entirety of the UK because he didn’t believe that there should be ‘parity of esteem’ between Westminster and devolved administrations. This, along with the fact that SAGE didn’t take into account health data from devolved nations in the earlier stages of the pandemic, would have made it hard to ensure that whole nation policies were effective in saving lives in devolved nations. Although devolved administrations were able to make decisions about lockdowns in their own nations, furlough was funded by the Westminster government. Devolved leaders should have played a key role in UK wide decision making, but were prevented from doing so. 

The revelations that are already emerging from Module 2 of the Inquiry are deeply distressing for anyone who lost a loved one to Covid 19 as a result of poor governance and disastrous decision making. But, if learnt from, these revelations will save lives in future pandemics. The systems for delivering scientific advice to policy makers must be improved, but, at the end of the day, it will always be up to elected politicians to make the big policy calls. While the Inquiry reflects on how the provision of scientific advice can be improved, the nation must reflect on who it wants to be making the life and death decisions when the next crisis comes.